The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology is very important to support the electronic commerce and digital communications on existing networks. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is the standard protocol for retrieving certificate revocation information in the PKI. To minimize the damages caused by OCSP responder's private key exposure, a distributed OCSP composed of multiple responders is needed. This paper presents a new distributed OCSP with a single public key by using key-insulated signature scheme [6] . In proposed distributed OCSP, each responder has the different private key, but corresponding public key remains fixed. Therefore the user simply obtains and stores one certificate, and can verify any responses by using a single public key.
Introduction

Background and Motivation
In the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a certificate is use to bind an entity's identity information with the corresponding public key. Nevertheless, certificates are revoked in case of breaking that binding before its expiration date. Thus, the certificate verifier must check not only the expiration date on the certificate but also the revocation information of it.
A certificate revocation system can be implemented in several ways. The most well-known method is to periodically publish a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [7] , [9] , which is a digitally signed list of revoked certificates and usually issued by the Certification Authority (CA). The main advantage of the CRL systems is its simplicity, but several problems are pointed out [1] , [24] . Especially, the main disadvantage of the CRL systems is its high communication costs between the user and the repository, because the size of CRL will be quite long if the CA has many clients. a) E-mail: satoshi@itslab.csce.kyushu-u.ac.jp b) E-mail: sakurai@csce.kyushu-u.ac.jp * A preliminary version of this paper is presented at 2004 International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography (PKC2004) [13] .
To overcome the shortcomings of the CRL, several revocation methods are suggested as follows. The Delta CRLs [9] are issued more frequently and only include updates to the complete revocation list called Base CRL. CRL Distribution Points was specified in [9] . CRL Distribution Points allow revocation information within a single domain to be divided into the multiple CRLs. So the CRL of each domain can be smaller than the full CRL. The Certificate Revocation Tree (CRT) was proposed by Kocher [12] . CRTs are based on Merkle Hash Trees [15] , in which the tree itself represents all certificate revocation information. The status of any given certificate can be proved by using the path from the root to the target leaf. Therefore, the communication costs between the user and repository can be lower than those of CRL systems. Naor and Nissim proposed the Authenticated Directory [20] , which improves the reduction in communication cost by balancing the hash tree. They introduced using a 2-3 tree, in which every node has two or three children. In [10] , [11] , the binary hash tree is extended to k-ary hash tree in which any node has at most k children. Micali proposed the revocation system using hash chains [16] , [17] , taking into account both user's and CA's efficiency. The advantage of Micali's system is that the communication costs are very efficient, because the user may just obtain 160-bit hash value.
It is necessary to obtain timely information regarding the revocation status of a certificate. The most popular mechanism that provides real-time status of a certificate is the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [19] . The OCSP provides the up-to-date response to certificate status queries. Since the user just requests to return the status of certificate, the communication costs can be reduced, compared with the CRL system. The certificate status is returned by a trusted entity referred to as an OCSP responder. The OCSP responder creates signed responses by using own private key. As the extended protocol of the OCSP, the validation protocols which the server builds and validates the certification path instead of the user are proposed [14] , [23] . In mobile environment, the OCSP appears to be a good choice, because the user can retrieve timely certificate's status with a moderate resource usage. However, there are two threats as follows.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
In the OCSP, the responder should generate a signed response for every user's request. That is, for every simple request sent by the attacker, the responder The countermeasure against those threats is important.
Related Work
1. Response pre-production To reduce the risk of DoS attacks, OCSP responders may pre-produce signed responses specifying the status of certificates at a specified time [19] . In this case, the responder does not perform a digital signature for every response, so the computational costs of the responder are more efficient than those of traditional OCSP responder. The pre-produced response contains the times : thisUpdate and nextUpdate. thisUpdate is the time at which the status being indicated is known to be correct. nextUpdate is the time at or before which newer information will be available about the status of certificate. The user can confirm that the response is fresh by checking its validity interval through thisUpdate and nextUpdate. However, the use of pre-produced responses allows replay attacks in case that the validity of pre-produced response is long [19] . To avoid the replay attacks, the responder needs to generate pre-produced responses within a short period of time. But this consumes a lot of processing and this fact may lead the responder against to denial of service. To mitigate the computational costs of the responder, the pre-produced responses are updated using hash-chain [18] . In this scheme, the responder can update the pre-produced responses at low cost.
Protection of private keys
As well as CA's private keys, responder's private key must be stored very carefully. There are some approaches to protect the private key from attackers. A Hardware Security Module (HSM) may reduce the risk of key compromise. An attacker requires penetration or theft of the HSM to retrieve responder's private key. To evaluate the security of HSM objectively, the security requirements for cryptographic modules are specified in [22] . Another approach is to manage a share of responder's private key on different servers by using a threshold cryptography [4] . A proactive signature [3] is the enhanced threshold solution by periodic refreshment of shares. These approaches can be effective, but key exposures caused by operation mistakes or misconfigurations appear to be unavoidable.
Our Contributions
As mentioned above, it is difficult to avoid all of threats completely. If the OCSP responder is centralized, the entire system is affected by DoS attacks and compromising responder's private key. That is, the entire service is not available in those cases. Therefore, minimizing damages caused by these threats is extremely important to employ the OCSP system. A distributed OCSP (D-OCSP) composed of multiple responders can mitigate these damages. In case that each responder has the same private key, compromising any responder compromises the entire system [17] . On the other hand, if each responder has the different private key, compromising a responder cannot affect the others. Hence, this paper examines the D-OCSP that each responder has the different private key. In the existing D-OCSP, the CA issues responder's certificate. However, the user's load becomes heavy. OCSP responder should send own certificate attached to a response. The size of a response is long, compared with the response which does not attach the responder's certificate. Moreover, users must check the status of responder's certificate This paper proposes a new D-OCSP with a single public key by using key-insulated signature scheme (KIS) based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem [6] . The KIS is one of the methods for mitigating the damage caused by private key exposures. Using a KIS-enabled responder, compromise of responder's private key only affects at short time period. We focus on the property that all signatures can be verified by using fixed public key in KIS. This paper takes a different approach from KIS-enabled responder. The multiple private keys are generated by using key update algorithm in KIS. And the CA assigns them to the separate responders, respectively. Thus each responder has the different private key, but corresponding public key remains fixed. Additionally, users can verify any responses by using a single public key. Once the user obtained responder's certificate, she simply stores and utilizes it during its validity. Thereby, OCSP responders don't have to send own certificate attached to a response message. In our D-OCSP, communication costs are more efficient in comparison with the existing D-OCSP. In order to check the status of responder's certificates, we uses the Micali's revocation method [17] . The user can check the status of responder's certificates efficiently.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the traditional D-OCSP, in which the CA issues responder's certificate with a short lifetime, and discuss the issues of traditional D-OCSP. In Section 3, we describe the proposed D-OCSP, including the validation of responder's private key and decentralization processes of responders. Section 4 details the viewpoints of security and performance of our D-OCSP. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
Distributed OCSP
Preliminary
In a distributed OCSP (D-OCSP), there are three entities, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Certification Authority (CA)
A Certification Authority (CA) is a trusted third party that has the responsibility of publishing the certificate revocation information. Compromise of CA's private key will affect the entire system, so the CA is isolated from the Internet to prevent unauthorized accesses.
Responder
A responder is a trusted entity that sends the certificate status information to users. In case of generating the response message containing the status of requested certificate, a responder digitally signs it by own private key. In this paper, the status of a certificate is either "valid" or "revoked."
User
It is assumed that users trust a CA and responders. They send the request message of certificate status to the responder.
In this section, we explain the existing D-OCSP using responder's certificates. If each responder has the same private key, the compromising of any responder compromises the entire system [17] . Thus, we examine the D-OCSP that each responder has the different key-pair (PK i , S K i ). PK i and S K i denote the responder i's public key and signing private key, respectively. D-OCSP composed of n-responders is shown in Figure 1 . The CA issues each responder's certificate digitally signed by its own private key. As well as the traditional certificate, the user should check revocation information of responder's certificates. There are some ways of checking those information [7] . The simplest method is to use the CRL issued by CA. Another way is to use the responder's certificate with a short lifetime. Using short-lived certificates, users don't have to check the validation of responder's certificate. 
Verification Processes
In case that the user receives the response from responder i, she should verify that response as follows.
1. The user obtains the certificate of responder's by online or offline. In this paper, it is assumed that OCSP responder sends the responder' certificate attached to a response message. 2. The user verifies the digital signature contained responder's certificate by using CA's public key. 3. The user verifies the digital signature contained the response by using responder's public key.
Discussions
1. User Efficiency OCSP responder sends the responder' certificate attached to a response message. The size of a response is long, compared with the response which does not attach the responder's certificate. Therefore, the communication costs between a user and a responder are not efficient. Even if the CA issues the long-lived responder's certificate, the user needs to download and store the different responder's certificate in case of receiving responses sent by the different responder. So the memory space of the user's terminal will be increasing.
CA Efficiency
The CA needs to issue responder's certificates frequently. Thereby, the CA needs to produce a digital signature and the computational costs are increasing.
Proposed Method
This paper proposes a new D-OCSP with a single public key. In detail, we use a key-insulated signature scheme (KIS) [6] . In our method, responder's private keys are generated at once. The user can verify any responses by using a single public key. Before suggesting the decentralization method, we explain the KIS in detail. A lot of the digital signature schemes have been proposed, but they provide no security guarantees in case of private key exposures. To minimize the damage caused by the leakage of private keys, the notion of key-insulated security was introduced in [5] and a KIS is formalized by Dodis, Katz, Xu, and Yung [6] . As in a standard signature scheme, the user begins by registering a single public key that remains fixed for the lifetime of the protocol, while the corresponding private key can be changed frequently. A master secret key is stored on physically secure device. The lifetime of the protocol is divided into distinct periods 1, 2, . . . , N. At the beginning of period i, the user interacts with the secure device to derive a temporary private key S K i . Even if S K i is exposed, an attacker cannot forge signatures for any other time periods. Moreover, in a strong (t, N)-keyinsulated scheme, an attacker cannot forge signature for any of remaining N − t periods even if she obtains the private keys for up to t periods. Using a KIS-enabled responder, responses are signed using responder's private key S K i at time period i. In that case, the attacker can forge the responses only during period i, if S K i is compromised. That is, compromise of responder's private key only affects those responses at the point of compromise.
We focus on the property that all signatures can be verified by using fixed public key. This paper takes a different approach from KIS-enabled responder. Suppose the total number of responders is n in our D-OCSP. n private keys are generated using key update algorithm in KIS. The CA assigns them to the separate n responders, respectively. Each responder has the different private key, but corresponding public key remains fixed. In our method, verifiers can verify responses sent by any responders using a single public key. The details of these processes are described in Section 3.3.
Besides a key-insulated model, alternate approaches have been proposed. The first such example is a forwardsecure signature scheme (FSS) proposed by Bellare and Miner [2] . This scheme can prevent compromise of private keys at the previous time periods, even if an attacker exposes the current private key. However, once the attacker exposes the current private key, she can easily derive the private keys of the future periods. Like a proposed model, a D-OCSP using FSS has the advantage that the user can verify any responses using a single public key, but this D-OCSP cannot minimize the impact caused by compromising responder's private keys. Another approach is a intrusion-resilient signature scheme (IRS) proposed by Itkis and Reyzin [8] . This scheme adds key-insulation to a proactive refresh capability which may be performed more frequently than key updates. That is, the master key is also changed frequently. IRS can be tolerant multiple corruptions of both the user and the physically secure device. Any signatures are secure if both of devices are compromised, as long as the compromises are not simultaneous. Compared to FSS and KIS, IRS has a high security. In our method, however, a master secret key stored on physically secure device is only used during private key generations. Thus the CA doesn't have to update the master key since the CA can delete it after key generations are finished. Taking into account the computational efficiency, this paper examines the decentralization method of the responder using KIS.
Preliminaries (Notations)
• n is the total number of responders.
• H is the one-way hash function.
• R i is the responder. (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) • X t,i is the hash value at time period t for validation of R i .
• PK res is the responder's public key.
• S K i is the R i 's signing private key.
• S K * is the master key to be used generating of responder's private keys. S K * is stored on the physically secure device.
• RM is the response message containing the status of requested certificate.
• C res is the responder's certificate.
(Assumptions)
1. The secure channels are established between the CA and each responders. 2. The CA has the physically secure device and must store the master key on it. 3. All responders and users have synchronized clocks.
Validation of Responder's Private Key
In this section, we examine the validation method of responder's private key. The user needs to check that a responder's certificate has not been revoked. There are some ways of checking those information [7] . The simplest method is that the user checks the offline verification using like a CRL issued by the CA. While, the CA may choose not to specify any method of revocation checking for responder's certificate. In that case, responder's certificate with a very short lifetime should be issued. In the traditional D-OCSP mentioned in Section 2, the user doesn't have to check the validation of responder's certificate. However, the D-OCSP using responder's certificate with a short lifetime has disadvantages. The first problem is that communication costs are inefficient, since OCSP responder should send the responder' certificate attached to a response message. Moreover, CA's computational costs become high because of updating responder's certificate frequently.
In our D-OCSP, each responder has the different private key, but corresponding public key remains fixed. We utilize revocation method proposed by Micali [17] . Micali's revocation system is efficient as to the user's computational costs. Our method uses a one-way hash function H satisfying the following properties, as well as Micali's system.
(One-way hash function) 1 . H is at least 1,000 times faster to compute than a digital signature based on public key technique. 2. H produces 20-byte outputs.
H is hard to invert, given Y, finding X such that H(X) =
Y is practically impossible. 4. H is a collision-resistant hash function.
Issuance of Responder's Certificate
1. Let T be the total number of time-periods. For example, T is 365 if each responder's certificate expires 365 days after issuance. The CA produces T hash value using H as follows.
The CA repeatedly produces n hash-chain as different input value X T,i . The CA stores these hash values.
2. The CA issues C res by using own private key. S N is the serial number of certificate and V represents the validity period. I and S denote issuer and subject of certificate, respectively.
Validation of Responder's Private Key 1. The CA delivers the hash value X t,i to R i , if responder S K i is valid at t time period. If S K i is compromised, the CA deletes the hash chain for S K i . 2. When R i returns the response to the user at period t, she also delivers the hash value X t,i to the user.
3. When the user receives the response by R i , she verifies the digital signature by using PK res . Then the user can check the validation of S K i using X t,i and X 1,i contained C res . In detail, the user checks the following equation.
If that equation is satisfied, the user can certify that S K i is valid.
In this way, the user can verify the validation of the responder's private key. C res is not revoked during its validity unless all of responder's private keys are compromised.
Decentralization Method of Responder
We describe the decentralizing process using KIS based on the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem [6] . Figure 2 shows the D-OCSP using our method.
Step1: Generation of responder's private keys
Key pair generation
Let p and q be prime numbers such that p = 2q + 1 and let g, h be a element of order q in the group Z p . PK res is generated by choosing x, y ∈ R Z q and setting v = g x h y .
Responder's private key generation A partial key S K i is generated as follows. S K i is used to derive R i 's private key.
By using partial keys derived above, n private keys are generated. Once all private keys is derived, S K i and S K * are deleted.
The CA delivers the private key S K i to R i securely. Thus, each responder has the different private key.
Issuance of responder's certificate
As mentioned section 3.2, the CA issues the responder's certificate C res as follows.
Step2: Signature and verification algorithm
Signature algorithm
When R i returns the response RM to the user, she generates a digital signature σ i (RM) = i, w, a, b by using S K i as follows.
Verification algorithm
The user can verify R i 's signature by using PK res as follows. 
Evaluations
Security
Suppose that an attacker steals S K i and hash value X t,i at time period t. In this case, she cannot derive any other responder's private keys unless she obtain S K * , since S K * is deleted after generating responder's private keys. And if an attacker can get the hash value X t,i , she cannot derive the hash value X t+1,i such as H(X t+1,i ) = X t,i , since H is a one-way function. Therefore, an attacker cannot cheat that S K i is valid after period t + 1. However, anyone can obtain the most recent X t,i by sending a request to R i . So, an attacker who steals S K i at a certain time period still can forge responses in later periods, until the CA detects the compromise of S K i and stops delivering X t,i to R i . The traditional D-OCSP has the same issues. In general, it is difficult to detect the exposure of private keys. A KIS-enabled D-OCSP can minimize the damage caused by the leakage of private keys, because private keys are updated at short period. Therefore, a KIS-enabled D-OCSP has the high security, compared with our proposed D-OCSP and a traditional D-OCSP. If some responders are compromised, the CA stops delivering the hash value to compromised responders. Once a responder is compromised, it has to stay out of the system until responder's certificate is expired. We think that the degradation of the system is not a significant problem. If some responders are compromised, the others are not compromised. That is, the user can utilize another responder. So the affect of the system is minimized even if some responders are compromised. 
Validation of responders
In our D-OCSP, validation of responder's private key is performed by using hash-chain, without downloading CRLs. As mentioned above, hash computation is much faster than digital signature computations. In case of checking the status of responder's certificate, the user just computes t-times hash computations.
CA Efficiency
The CA should store the hash value securely. The total size of those value amounts 20nT -bytes. However, the CA does not have to store all hash values and only store X T,i (20n-bytes), since hash computations is very fast. At period t, X t,i is derived by T − t times hash computations. In the traditional D-OCSP, the CA should issue the responder's certificate with a short lifetime. In our D-OCSP, the CA can issue long-lived responder's certificate, because the user can validate the responder's private key. Table 1 shows the comparison between our D-OCSP using KIS and the traditional D-OCSP using DSA. As the comparison items, we consider the size of a response, the verification cost of the user (validation of responder's certificate and verification cost), and signing cost of the responder.
This paper evaluates the size of responses by using OpenSSL (http://www.openssl.org). It is assumed that the size of CA's public key is 2048 bits and the size of responder's public key is 1024 bits. In our method, OCSP responder sends the response message, which doesn't attach the responder's certificate.
Let q be the parameter of digital signature scheme. We consider that |q| is 160. The computational cost is represented as the number of multiplications over Z p or Z q . Let EX Z p be the number of multiplications required to compute an exponentiation.
In our method, computational cost is less efficient than traditional D-OCSP, but the user may verify any responses by using a single public key. And the communication costs are efficient in comparison with those of traditional D-OCSP.
Finally, this paper compares proposed D-OCSP with the traditional OCSP, which the CA issues the responder's certificate with long lifetime.
1. In the traditional responder, the user should obtain n certificates, where n is the number of responders. The user needs to download and store the different responder's certificate in case of receiving responses sent by the different responder. So the memory space of the user's terminal will be increasing. On the other hand, the user simply obtains and caches one certificate. Even if the user requests the other responder, OCSP responders don't have to send the responder's certificate attached to the response message. Thus, the communication cost and memory space are efficient. 2. It is easier to validate the status of responder's certificate. In the traditional OCSP, the user should download the CRL. The disadvantage of the CRL is its high communication costs since the size of CRL will be quite long. On the other hand, the user simply obtains the hash value in our D-OCSP.
Conclusions
In order to minimize the damage caused by responder's private key exposure and DoS attacks, the distributed OCSP model composed of the multiple responders is required in real world. This paper suggests the new distributed OCSP model using key-insulated signature scheme. We utilize Micali's revocation method, then the user can check the validation of responder's private key efficiently. In proposed distributed OCSP, communication costs are efficient since the user can verify responses sent by any responders. As the future work, we will try to implement our system and evaluate the response time.
